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I. Introduction: A Judgment from the Balconies 
 
In December of 2000, Riccardo Muti, one of the most distinguished 
Verdi interpreters of his generation, opened the new opera season at Milan’s 
La Scala Opera House with a performance of Verdi’s Il Trovatore.1  The 
opening night at La Scala is not only the most eagerly awaited musical event 
in Italy; it is also one of the country’s most important social occasions.2  The 
usual attendees include politicians, aristocrats, movie stars, and upwardly 
mobile businesspeople, as well as the loggionisti, the diehard opera fans who 
wait in line for hours for standing-room tickets at La Scala, and who “are 
known for shouting out their candid appraisals of the singers from the upper 
galleries.”3  Muti’s performance was important for another reason: it began a 
yearlong celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of Verdi’s death, 
featuring many performances of the beloved composer’s operas.4  Muti’s 
Il Trovatore featured the thirty-two-year-old tenor Salvatore Licitra, whom 
some critics had dubbed “the new Pavarotti.”5  (Licitra, blessed with the most 
golden and powerful voice, was, sadly, to die eleven years later from injuries 
sustained in a motor-scooter accident.)6 
Jay McInerney, writing in The New Yorker, reported that the new season 
was off to a flying start until the end of the third act, when Licitra delivered 
one of the opera’s famous arias, the rousing cabelleta “Di quella pira.”7  At 
the end of the aria the crowd suddenly erupted with loud booing and cries of 
“Shame!” emanating from the upper galleries.8  The well-heeled patrons in 
the lower boxes and orchestra seats tried in vain to quiet the offenders.9  
“Then, in a voice nearly as loud as any heard from the stage that night, one of 
 
 * Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School.  My 
thanks to Sanford Levinson for his comments on a previous draft. 
1. Jay McInerney, Milan Notebook: A Night at La Scala, NEW YORKER, Dec. 25, 2000 & 
Jan. 1, 2001, at 60, 60. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id.; Wilborn Hampton, Domingo’s Voice Fails; Return Brings Cheers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/15/arts/domingo-s-voice-fails-return-brings-cheers.html. 
5. McInerney, supra note 1. 
6. Zachary Woolfe, Salvatore Licitra, Operatic Tenor at Met, Is Dead at 43, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/arts/music/salvatore-licitra-tenor-at-the-met-
dies-at-43-after-crash.html?ref=salvatorelicitra&_r=0. 
7. McInerney, supra note 1. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
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the loggionisti, a bank teller named Mauro Fuolega, shrieked, ‘It’s the 
conductor’s fault!’”10  Muti indignantly stopped the performance and glared 
up at his critic in the gallery.11  “Let’s not turn Verdi’s centennial into a 
circus,” he declared, and he resumed conducting the opera over the 
murmurings of the shocked audience.12 
What had just happened?  It turns out that it was a dispute about 
interpretation.  Licitra did not sing a high C, “the famous do di petto, with 
which tenors have traditionally ended” the aria.13  (The term do di petto 
means “C from the chest,” the idea being that the tenor employs his chest 
register—a difficult feat—rather than using his head register and singing 
falsetto.)14  As Mr. Fuolega’s exclamation suggested, the problem was not 
with Salvatore Licitra, who could no doubt have produced the high C with 
aplomb.  Instead, Licitra was following the orders of Maestro Muti, who had 
told him to sing the G below the high C.  Muti’s reason was simple: The G, 
and not the C, appears in Verdi’s original score.15  Verdi’s high C, it turns 
out, is not Verdi’s at all; it was added to the opera by later interpreters.16 
At a post-performance dinner Muti “explained that the do di petto [in 
the aria] had originated with the nineteenth-century French tenor Carlo 
Baucardé.”17  Other tenors adopted the practice because they wanted to end 
the third act with an impressive vocal display guaranteed to bring down the 
house.18  Eventually it became the traditional method of performing the aria 
on stage, in concerts, and in recordings.19  Muti, on the other hand, “said that 
he had considered it his duty to honor the composer’s intentions by leaving 
out the high C.” 20   This was not, in fact, the first time that Muti had 
performed Il Trovatore this way.  In 1977, at the Teatro Comunale in 
Florence, Muti had also insisted on the G, and, as Verdi scholar Philip 
Gossett reports, “all that anyone talked about was the end of ‘Di quella 
pira.’”21 
Well, who is right?  Is it Mauro Fuolega and other members of the 
audience, who expect their thrilling high C, or Riccardo Muti, who can point 






14. RICHARD MILLER, NATIONAL SCHOOLS OF SINGING: ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN, AND 
ITALIAN TECHNIQUES OF SINGING REVISITED 109–10 (1997) (distinguishing the do di petto from 
the use of falsetto). 
15. PHILIP GOSSETT, DIVAS AND SCHOLARS: PERFORMING ITALIAN OPERA 124 (2006). 
16. See id. 
17. McInerney, supra note 1. 
18. GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 124. 
19. See McInerney, supra note 1. 
20. Id. 
21. GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 124. 
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Contrast this story with a second one.  In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided a series of school desegregation cases from Virginia, Kansas, South 
Carolina, and Delaware collectively called Brown v. Board of Education.22  
At the same time, it also heard a case from the District of Columbia, Bolling 
v. Sharpe. 23   The issue in Bolling and Brown was the same: the 
constitutionality of segregated schools.24  But the problem was that Bolling 
involved the District of Columbia, a federal territory, not a state.25  The 
Supreme Court decided Brown under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which says that “no state shall . . . deny . . . the 
equal protection of the laws.”26  The text of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not seem to mention the federal 
government, although the text of the Fifteenth Amendment does, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which outlaws slavery throughout the United States, 
also binds the federal government.27 
Thus, Justice Warren and his colleagues were faced with a genuine 
problem.  The text does not seem specifically to mention an equality 
guarantee against the federal government.  Hence Chief Justice Warren and 
his brethren read an equal protection guarantee into the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.28 
So we have two cases.  In 2000 Riccardo Muti refuses to read the 
customary high C into Verdi’s score when a G appears there.  In 1954, Earl 
Warren and his brethren read an equal protection guarantee into the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 
22. 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954). 
23. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
24. Id. at 498. 
25. Id. at 499. 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
27. Of course, depending on how broadly one reads the Thirteenth Amendment—for example, 
as a general prohibition on nondomination, or as a general guarantee of equality in civil society—it 
could form the basis for Bolling.  See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous 
Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1459, 1470 (2012) (noting that the principle against 
nondomination could extend to many different areas of social life); Jack M. Balkin, The 
Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1816 (2010) (noting that many Reconstruction 
Republicans assumed that once blacks were free, they enjoyed full and equal civil rights).  The 
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also applies to both the states and the federal 
government and might be an alternative basis for Bolling.  See Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and 
the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2166569.  Both of these solutions, however, 
would raise interpretive questions of their own, akin to the debates discussed in the text. 
 Ironically, the Reconstruction Republicans who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment assumed that 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause already contained a guarantee of equal protection, and 
they based the language of the equal protection on what was then a familiar nineteenth-century 
interpretation of the Due Process Clause.  See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 251–55 
(2011) (“[T]he very words ‘equal protection’ were added to the Constitution based on a widely 
accepted construction of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.” (emphasis omitted)). 
28. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (“[D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of 
due process.”). 
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What do these stories have in common?  They are both problems of 
performance—one in music and one in law.  When law professors have 
looked for analogies between law and the arts, they have generally turned to 
poems and novels.29  Sanford Levinson and I, who were both part of the early 
law and literature movement,30 have concluded that this analogy is incom-
plete.31  A much better analogy, we think, is to the performing arts—such as 
music and drama—that perform written texts and to the institutions and 
ensembles that are charged with the responsibilities and duties of public 
performance.32  Not all of the performing arts perform written texts, but 
many of them do, and the performer’s obligation to put a text into action 
before an audience offers the most interesting and fruitful analogy to the 
problems of legal interpretation. 
Different genres of the performing arts, of course, use texts in different 
ways.  This Essay will primarily focus on classical music and opera, in which 
the score offers a fairly comprehensive—if incomplete—set of directions.  In 
many genres of the performing arts, like improvisatory theatre or jazz, the 
relevant text may be quite barebones, with most of the work left to the 
performer.  Yet even where the text is the most detailed, it cannot perform 
itself; it has to be brought to life through performance.  There is often more 
than one way to do this, and the performer’s art depends on how this is 
achieved. 
The life of the law, like that of music or drama, is in performance.  The 
American Legal Realists famously distinguished “law on the books” from 
“law in action.”33  In fact, law in action is paramount; someone must apply 
legal texts in order for law to function as an ongoing institution.  The social 
practice of law is more than legal texts, just as the social practice of music is 
more than written scores and the social practice of drama is more than 
written scripts. 
Poetry and novels can be read silently to one’s self.  Music and drama 
are normally performed before an audience.  (Sometimes, of course, the 
performers overlap with the audience, as in a group sing-along.)  Performers 
must decide, often under very imperfect circumstances, how a text should be 
applied in the social context before them.  Performers seek to persuade their 
 
29. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on “The 
Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of Jews,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1518 (1999) 
[hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music]; Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, 
Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1607 (1991) [hereinafter 
Levinson & Balkin, Other Performing Arts]. 
30. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); 
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373 (1982). 
31. Balkin & Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music, supra note 29; Levinson & Balkin, Other 
Performing Arts, supra note 29, at 1608–14. 
32. Balkin & Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music, supra note 29. 
33. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 14 (1910); see also 
Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—the Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 435 n.3 (1930) 
(reiterating the distinction while criticizing Pound’s conception). 
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audiences that their interpretations are true, valuable, and authoritative.  
Whether or not they succeed in this task, what they do affects people, for 
good or for ill.34 
Viewing law as a performing art puts in the foreground what is less 
salient in comparisons between law and literature: the crucial role of the 
audience in performances, whether musical, dramatic, or legal.  Law, like 
music and drama, involves more than a reader and a text.  It involves a 
complex of reciprocal influences between the creators of texts, the 
performers of texts, and the audiences affected by those performances. 
The performing arts therefore normally involve a triangle of 
performance.35  There is the person or institution that creates the text: the 
composer, the framer, or the adopter.  There is the performer whose job is to 
make sense of the text and bring it to life in the real world.  And finally, there 
is the audience before whom the text is performed.36 
Why are audiences so important?  First, the presence of an audience 
creates distinctive responsibilities for the performer—responsibilities of 
faithful performance not only to the author of the text, but also to the 
audience.  Part of the point of being a performer is to perform before 
someone—to move, impress, or affect an audience.  Performance is a 
relationship to another, with effects and responsibilities that come with that 
relationship.37 
Second, the interactions between the members of the audience and the 
performer may affect how performers behave and subtly or profoundly shape 
the result.  That is why live performance can often be so different from 
prerecorded or televised performance in terms of energy, spontaneity, and 
emotional connection.  The members of the audience not only affect the 
performers; they also affect each other’s experiences of the work.  
Expressions of excitement or boredom, applause, booing, laughter—even 
intrusions like smells, conversation, and background noise—shape the 
success and reception of a performance. 
Third, audiences play a crucial role in validating, authorizing, and 
legitimating performance.  Performances occur within traditions, institutions, 
and conventions of performance in which the audience plays a part.  For 
example, people behave differently and expect different things at the opera 
than they do at a rock concert. 
 
34. Balkin & Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music, supra note 29, at 1519–21. 
35. Id. at 1520. 
36. Id. at 1519–20.  Note that, under different circumstances, the three legs of the triangle of 
performance can be combined in different ways.  The author or composer can perform his or her 
own work; the members of the audience can also be the performers; or the performers can perform a 
work before its author.  There is also the limiting case in which the author, performer, and audience 
are identical. 
37. Id. at 1519–21. 
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Fourth, in the broadest sense, the audience for performance is the 
interpretive community in which performance occurs. 38   Traditions, 
institutions, and conventions of performance generate and enforce evaluative 
standards about when performances are authentic or inauthentic, legitimate 
or illegitimate, successful or unsuccessful.  When people assess the quality of 
performances, they employ the conventions, traditions, and assumptions of 
interpretive communities. 39   These communities evaluate, legitimate, and 
judge performances and, on occasion, even sanction or discipline them. 
Standards of good and bad performance, what is authentic and 
inauthentic, or “on-the-wall” and “off-the-wall,” change and evolve over 
time, as performers and the various audiences for performance interact, 
contend, and struggle over the right way to interpret and perform texts.  
Performance, therefore, always involves negotiation, not only between the 
performers and the audiences immediately before them, but within the larger 
interpretive communities in which performance occurs. 
The interpretive problems faced by Riccardo Muti and Earl Warren 
arise because a particular kind of text has to be performed before a particular 
kind of audience.  It has to be put in action and applied to a real, live 
situation.  In law and the performing arts, the combination of a text and an 
audience create distinctive problems for the performing artist. 
As we shall see, it turns out that arguments about how to perform 
Il Trovatore—and other pieces of music and drama—have a remarkable 
similarity to debates about interpretation in law, and particularly American 
constitutional law.  In this Essay, I will discuss three of these similarities.  
The first is that both law and the performing arts use very similar modalities 
of argument for justifying interpretations.  Second, in law and the performing 
arts, not everything goes.  Both law and the performing arts are constrained 
by canonicity, convention, and genre.  Third, in both law and the performing 
arts, evolving conventions of performance depend heavily on what audiences 
think.  There are multiple audiences at work in any performance, and these 
audiences are mediated by important and sometimes quite powerful 
institutions.  Changes in interpretation and in interpretive conventions 
depend on gaining the support of various institutions over time. 
 
38. On the theory of interpretive communities, see STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS 
CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 14, 171 (1980) (defining interpretive 
communities as those that share interpretive strategies for reading and writing texts).  Although Fish 
first invoked the idea in the context of literary interpretation, the idea of an interpretive community 
makes equal sense in the context of the performing arts. 
39. See Balkin & Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music, supra note 29, at 1520 (“Judgments 
about faithfulness and authenticity . . . occur against the backdrop of the many different 
communities that help shape the tradition, including the audience of fellow performers and 
laypersons.”). 
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II. The Modalities of Argument in Law and the Performing Arts 
How should one go about deciding whether Muti should have left out 
the high C, the do di petto?  How should one decide whether Chief Justice 
Warren should have read an equal protection guarantee into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment?  That is another way of asking how 
performers establish the legitimacy or the authority of their particular 
interpretations.  Because law, music, and drama involve the performance of 
texts, the kinds of arguments that people make to justify their interpretations 
in each activity are remarkably similar. 
Philip Bobbitt has offered a well-known list of the modalities of 
argument in constitutional law: text, history, structure, precedent, 
consequences, and ethos. 40   A modality, Bobbitt tells us, is a way of 
explaining why an interpretation is true or correct.41  It is a way of justifying 
what we are doing when we interpret.  It turns out that the modalities of 
argument in debates about performing music and drama are quite similar.  
This similarity is not an accident.  It comes from the fact that all three 
enterprises require us to put texts into practice, and in doing so, we have to 
explain why we are interpreting a text in practice in one way rather than 
another. 
Begin with arguments from the text.  At first glance, Muti’s position 
might seem particularly strong: The score says G, not C.  As Philip Gossett 
notes, “the [high C] in question never existed in any printed edition of the 
opera.  The ‘great moment’ is in fact an interpolation.”42   But as most 
lawyers and musicians will tell you, it’s not as simple as that.  Much depends 
on the background conventions through which one reads and interprets texts.  
We always read texts against a background set of assumptions, practices, and 
canons for reading them.  
Take the example of repeats in a musical score.  In the sonata-allegro 
form, for example, there is normally a repeat sign at the end of the exposition 
and before the development section.43  Sometimes the composer even writes 
a little extra music to smooth the transition back to the beginning of the 
exposition.44 
 
40. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 93 (1982); 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]. 
41. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 40, at 11. 
42. GOSSETT, supra note 15. 
43. See James Webster, Sonata Form, in 23 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS 687, 692 (Stanley Sadie & John Tyrrell eds., Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2d ed. 2001) 
(describing the sonata form). 
44. See id. (“In 18th-century music the exposition is almost always directed to be repeated, with 
or without a transition back to the opening.”). 
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It turns out, however, that sometimes classical music performers take 
the repeats and sometimes they don’t.45  Why would they feel authorized not 
to take the repeats?  After all, the score says “repeat.”  But as Bill Clinton 
would put it, it all depends upon what the meaning of “repeat” is. 
In fact, there are many reasons why a performer might not take all the 
repeats written in the score.  The performer wants the audience to receive the 
best aesthetic experience.  In a live concert, taking all the repeats might make 
the work too long and tire the audience.46  For the same reason, the full text 
of Shakespeare’s King Lear—and many other of his most famous plays—is 
rarely performed.47  In a recording, by contrast, many performers—and many 
music critics—will insist on taking all the repeats, even if the piece becomes 
much longer as a result.48  However, most music in the standard classical 
repertoire was written before the advent of musical recordings.49  In practice, 
the repeat sign does not invariably require repeats; it depends on the 
circumstances of the performance and nature of the audience, and 
performance practices have changed from the Classical era to the present.50  
 
45. See STEPHEN DAVIES, MUSICAL WORKS AND PERFORMANCES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EX-
PLORATION 213–14 (2001) (noting that exposition repeats are often omitted, and “if ignoring them 
does not unbalance the movement . . . their observance is unnecessary now because the audience is 
likely to be conversant with the work or to listen intently”); Michael Broyles, Organic Form and the 
Binary Repeat, 66 MUSICAL Q. 339, 339 (1980) (“Virtually every performer of the literature of the 
eighteenth century must face the question whether or not to repeat and often feels compelled to 
choose between fidelity to the score and artistic intuition.”); Hugh MacDonald, To Repeat or Not to 
Repeat?, 111 PROC. OF THE ROYAL MUSICAL ASS’N 121 (1984–1985) (noting that although today 
“[t]he decision whether or not to observe a repeat is shared between current convention and the 
caprice of the performer,” performance practices have changed considerably since the eighteenth 
century and that it is more likely that repeats were once mandatory). 
46. See Levinson & Balkin, Other Performing Arts, supra note 29, at 1600–01 (noting the 
contrasting views of pianist Alfred Brendel and musicologist Neal Zaslaw regarding following 
repeats in a musical score). 
47. See ALAN C. DESSEN, RESCRIPTING SHAKESPEARE: THE TEXT, THE DIRECTOR, AND MOD-
ERN PRODUCTIONS 12 (2004) (explaining that several “well-known scripts (e.g., Richard III, 
Hamlet, King Lear) are almost always streamlined so as to avoid four hours in the theatre”); Nelson 
Pressley, For Modern Shakespeare, Directors’ Adaptations May Be Kindest Cuts of All, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 12, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/for-modern-shakespeare-
directors-adaptations-may-be-kindest-cuts-of-all/2011/08/03/gIQAEQJ5AJ_story.html (describing 
commonplace practices of directors in cutting text and rearranging scenes). 
48. See, e.g., IVAN MARCH ET AL., THE PENGUIN GUIDE TO RECORDED CLASSICAL MUSIC 
2010, at 635–37 (2009) (praising Leopold Stokowski, Claudio Abbado and Claus Peter Flor for 
including the first movement exposition repeats in Mendelssohn’s symphonies and criticizing 
Herbert von Karajan for omitting them); GUNTHER SCHULLER, THE COMPLEAT CONDUCTOR 207 
(1998) (“I think it is mandatory for us performers to respect [Beethoven’s] decision of a first ending 
and an exposition repeat.”). 
49. See TIMOTHY DAY, A CENTURY OF RECORDED MUSIC: LISTENING TO MUSICAL HISTORY 
2–4 (2000) (noting that “[t]he first cylinder recordings issued commercially in any quantities went 
on sale in 1890” and “[t]he first grammophone records appeared on the market in 1894”). 
50. See, e.g., Jonathan Dunsby, The Formal Repeat, 112 J. ROYAL MUSICAL ASS’N 196, 206 
(1986–1987) (“Historically, the non-observance of Classical repeats is largely indefensible . . . [yet] 
it can be said with confidence that the time will never come when every performer observes all 
notated formal repeats in tonal music.”); MacDonald, supra note 45 (arguing that repeats in the 
eighteenth century were mandatory although performers today often omit them). 
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Here we see the crucial role of the triangle of performance.  Performance is 
always before an audience, and responsibilities toward the audience and the 
need to communicate to an audience shape conventions of performance and 
expectations about how to read and interpret a musical score. 
Thus, Muti cannot justify his performance merely by pointing to the 
text.  We have to understand what the text means in the light of performance 
practices of nineteenth-century Italian opera.  To be sure, Muti wants to be 
scrupulous about the score, but that is a scrupulousness born of the late 
twentieth/early twenty-first centuries.  It reflects the influence of a number of 
scholarly and performance movements in classical music, of which the most 
famous is the movement for “authentic” or historically informed 
performance. 51   What seems obvious to a late twentieth-century maestro 
might not be obvious to a nineteenth-century conductor, performing before a 
restive (and often talkative) audience in a provincial opera house in Italy.  
The opera of the nineteenth century was much more of a popular 
entertainment than it is today, even in Italy itself, and performers adjusted 
accordingly.52 
It was commonplace for artists to add ornamentation and grace notes to 
arias and sometimes even to transpose arias to keys that were easier to sing.53  
(In fact, as Hillary Porris has shown, well into the nineteenth century singers 
sometimes inserted entire arias by other composers.)54  Composers expected 
some alteration, but they did not want too much of it, and hence there was 
always a creative tension between authors, conductors, and singers.55  In the 
twenty-first century we might assume that the composer’s views should 
always prevail, but in the nineteenth century, composers only sometimes got 
their way, and sometimes, when the piece was performed by an equally 
temperamental diva or divo, they had to grin and bear it. 
 
51. For introductions to the historically informed performance movement of the late twentieth 
century, see AUTHENTICITY AND EARLY MUSIC (N. Kenyon ed. 1988); JOHN BUTT, PLAYING WITH 
HISTORY (2002); BERNARD D. SHERMAN, INSIDE EARLY MUSIC: CONVERSATIONS WITH 
PERFORMERS (1997). 
52. See Prudence Dunstone, Italian Vocal Music in the Early Nineteenth Century: Historical 
Versus Modern Interpretive Approaches, in MUSIC RESEARCH: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 40, 45–46 (Michael Ewans et al. eds., 2004) (“Composers’ scores of this period were 
never intended to be definitive documents.  On the contrary, they were plastic, and constantly 
adapted to the practical needs of the performers at hand. . . . [R]estoring a composition to its original 
autograph form . . .  does not necessarily produce a performance in accordance with the expectations 
or even the intentions of the composer.”). 
53. GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 293 (noting Verdi’s assumption that singers would ornament 
unless he gave explicit instructions to the contrary); Dunstone, supra note 52, at 51 (“Transposition 
and alterations to provide interest and to suit individual singers were commonplace.”). 
54. See HILARY PORISS, CHANGING THE SCORE: ARIAS, PRIMA DONNAS, AND THE AUTHORITY 
OF PERFORMANCE 3–4 (2009) (describing the phenomenon of “‘aria insertion[,]’ . . . the practice 
that allowed singers to introduce arias of their own choice into opera productions”). 
55. See id. at 23–24 (explaining that although “[l]ike his predecessors, Verdi allowed star per-
formers to influence the shape and contents of his operas, particularly early on in his career,” he 
increasingly sought to prevent theaters, performers, and censors from mangling his operas). 
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Textual arguments, therefore, must always be understood in the larger 
context of performance conventions.  To know what the text means, we also 
have to know what kinds of glosses and forms of improvisation conductors 
and performers are allowed within the tradition—or, if we are devotees of 
historically informed performance, were allowed in the relevant period. 
Moreover, we might also have to look at the purpose behind the text to 
see what kinds of glosses are reasonable and permissible.  The reason why 
Verdi wrote a G might have less to do with what he actually wanted and 
more to do with the cast of characters he had to work with at the premiere.  
Philip Gossett explains that “Verdi wrote the role of Manrico for Carlo 
Baucardé, a tenor whose effective range it presumably reflects.”56  Verdi “did 
not feel that Baucardé had a usable high c, nor a high b, and only a most 
uncertain high b[-flat].” 57   If Verdi had believed that Baucardé could 
regularly hit the high C with confidence, Verdi might have included it in the 
original score.  Today, however, given that the best tenors can sing the 
high C (and bring down the house) perhaps it is more consistent with Verdi’s 
intentions to allow the interpolation.  This is an argument from hypothetical 
original intention.  An analogous argument in constitutional law would be 
that if the Framers were alive today, and understood modern markets and 
modern telecommunications and transportation technologies, they would 
have accepted an expansive power to regulate interstate commerce. 
Baucardé, it turns out, was more confident of his abilities than Verdi 
was, and he began throwing in high Cs shortly after Il Trovatore’s 
premiere. 58   In his study of Verdi’s operas, Julian Budden relates that 
Baucardé supposedly added not one but two high Cs—one at the end of the 
aria and one at the words “O teco almeno”—in a performance in Florence in 
1855.59  Another tradition states that they were introduced by the famous 
mid-nineteenth-century tenor Enrico Tamberlick.60   Tamberlick, it seems, 
really liked to show off his range.  He once tried to astonish the composer 
Gioacchino Rossini by producing a high C-sharp.61  Rossini was not amused.  
He told Tamberlick that he could hang his C-sharp in the hall of the opera 
house and pick it up on the way out after the performance.62 
By contrast, Budden explains, “Verdi was more complaisant.”63  Before 
approaching Verdi with a request to include the do di petto,  
 
56. GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 125. 
57. Id. at 126. 
58. 2 JULIAN BUDDEN, THE OPERAS OF VERDI 98 (1978); HERBERT LINDENBERGER, SITUAT-
ING OPERA: PERIOD, GENRE, RECEPTION 11 (2010). 
59. BUDDEN, supra note 58. 
60. Id. at 98, 531. 
61. Id. at 98, 530. 
62. Id. at 98. 
63. Id. 
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Tamberlick had already experimented with it in various provincial 
theatres where, he told the composer, it was in great demand with the 
public.  “Far be it from me,” Verdi had answered, “to deny the public 
what it wants.  Put in the high C if you like provided it is a good 
one.”64 
This famous anecdote contains a wealth of possible interpretive 
arguments.  For example, modern tenors might argue that Verdi had 
sanctioned the high C if it was performed properly.  The best interpretation 
of the score, then, is “sing the high C if you can do it really well; otherwise, 
stick to the G.”  This could either be an argument from original intentions 
(Verdi actually approved of a C by the right singer), or an argument for 
interpreting open-ended texts in a way that produces the best results.  When 
the conventions of performance allow for some leeway, the singer may 
choose the interpretation that produces the best aesthetic consequences.  Put 
in Dworkinian terms, when the conventions of musical practice allow it, we 
should attempt to make the score the best it can be.65 
On the other hand, one might argue that it doesn’t matter what Verdi 
intended after the fact; what matters is the score he actually wrote.  Original 
public meaning should trump original intentions, and what Verdi thought 
later on cannot change the nature of the work he actually composed.  But this 
simply brings us back to what original public meaning was.  Any opera 
composer writing in Italy knew that the singers would interpolate notes to 
show off their skills, and that the audience would expect and even demand 
this.66  Conversely, “[p]erformers of Italian opera have been making internal 
cuts in musical numbers since the operas were written, and it seems unlikely 
that they will stop in the foreseeable future.” 67   Therefore we cannot 
understand the original public meaning of a nineteenth-century Italian opera 
score in the same way we might approach one written in the twenty-first 
century.  The original public meaning might include the convention that the 
score is always subject to tasteful embellishments.68 
 
64. Id. at 98–99. 
65. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 52–55, 421–22 n.12 (1986) (arguing that in con-
structive interpretation, social practices should be understood in their best light). 
66. See GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 293 (explaining that more than any other form of classical 
music, nineteenth-century Italian opera retained eighteenth-century performance conventions in 
which composers “expected soloists (vocal and instrumental) to ornament lyrical lines” and that 
“only in Italian opera was ornamentation integral to the performance of newly composed notated 
works”).  Gossett offers the example of the first performance of Rossini’s most famous opera, Il 
barbiere di Siviglia (The Barber of Seville), in which the lead tenor Manuel García “was paid three 
times as much for singing the work as Rossini was for composing it,” and Rossini was required by 
contract “to make where needed all those alterations necessary either to ensure the good reception of 
the music or to meet the circumstances and convenience of those same singers, at the simple request 
of the Impresario, because so it must be and no other way.”  Id. at xv. 
67. Id. at 263. 
68. One might argue that the original expected application of Verdi’s score is less important 
than whether the text of the score gives later interpreters discretion to add interpolations.  On the 
other hand, the score itself does not tell us how much discretion it affords; we may need to 
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Here again, the triangle of performance matters greatly to interpretation.  
When Verdi explained that he would not “deny the public what it wants,”69 
he was adverting to the duty of both composers and performers to the 
audience.  Ultimately, the audience—or audiences, for there are always 
multiple audiences implicit in any performance—would be the judge of 
which interpretation was the best one.  “At the time of Muti’s Trovatore in 
Florence [in 1977],” Gossett reports, “one Italian critic commented that the 
high c, even if not written by Verdi, was a gift that the people had given to 
Verdi.”70  Such a gift, once given, could not easily be refused.  This looks 
remarkably like an argument for popular or democratic constitutionalism.  
Under the same reasoning, it does not matter that the framers and adopters of 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend or expect that the Equal Protection 
Clause would one day require integrated public schools, the legality of 
interracial marriage, or equal rights for women and gays.  These rights are a 
“gift” to the Constitution from later generations of the American people. 
Verdi’s remark might also form the beginning of an argument from 
precedent.  If tenors regularly sing the high C, and audiences have come to 
expect it, at some point this gloss appropriately becomes part of the score as 
performed, regardless of what the text—viewed in isolation from performing 
practices—might say.  Perhaps Verdi would not have wanted the C initially, 
but the regular interaction of performers and audiences has authorized a 
tradition of performance that audiences expect and appreciate.71  For them, 
the real and true Il Trovatore is the version with the high C.  These 
expectations are worth respecting.  As noted above, they are a gift of the 
Italian people to Verdi, and to spurn them would be both ungracious and 
impolite. 
Under this account, Maestro Muti is not a traditionalist, and merely the 
humble servant of Giuseppe Verdi.  His insistence on following the literal 
text is revolutionary.  It is designed to shock the audience and arouse it from 
its dogmatic slumbers.  The audience has gotten lazy and too used to judging 
the musical merits of the opera based on a few high notes.  By returning to 
the original text, Muti wants to push back at them, perhaps even teach them a 
lesson about musical excellence. 
This example is by no means unusual.  Arguments for discarding 
traditional interpretive glosses and returning to an imagined origin (like the 
original meaning of a text) are usually revolutionary, not conservative.  
 
understand mid-nineteenth-century performance practices to help us answer this question.  Cf. 
BALKIN, supra note 27, at 46 (arguing that “fidelity to a written constitution requires that we do our 
best to respect the text’s allocation of freedom and constraint for future constitutional construction,” 
which may require us to understand “how language was generally and publicly used”). 
69. BUDDEN, supra note 58 at 98–99. 
70. GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 127. 
71. See, e.g., LINDENBERGER, supra note 58 (“Do not these practices have the authority that 
attaches to long-standing precedent?  Does one want to allow an audience accustomed to the high c 
to feel let down as Act III comes to its dramatic conclusion?”). 
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Protestantism, with its desire to return to scripture alone, and to the pure 
Christianity of the early church fathers, is a good example.72   American 
conservatives’ turn to originalism was part of a revolutionary mobilization 
for political change—movement conservatism—which was not conservative 
in the Burkean sense but sometimes quite radical in its political goals.73 
The idea that the high C is the gift of the people to Verdi brings us to 
the next of Bobbitt’s modalities—arguments from ethos.  Mauro Fuolega and 
his fellow critics in the audience were not merely invoking precedent.  They 
were, in effect, accusing Muti of defacing an honored symbol of Italian art.  
By its nature, they might have argued, Italian opera celebrates bravura 
display—it revels in emotional excess and feats of artistic one-upmanship.  
By ordering Licitra to suppress the natural instincts of every red-blooded 
Italian tenor, Muti had been false to the ethos and character of a 
longstanding, transgenerational institution.  In the same way, defenders of the 
result in Bolling v. Sharpe might argue that the arc of the American 
Constitution bends toward justice, that the deep meaning of the American 
constitutional tradition is the fulfillment in history of the Declaration’s 
guarantee that all persons are created equal.  A judge who refuses to integrate 
the District of Columbia schools because of a too-narrow construction of the 
Constitution’s words does not really understand the meaning of America or 
the great narrative of American progress. 
In addition to arguments about text, history, precedent, consequences, 
and ethos, there are also arguments about structure.  In constitutional law, 
structural arguments concern how the various parts of a constitution fit 
together and how institutions created by the text should properly interact.  
Because they often invoke historical sources, structural arguments are 
sometimes confused with arguments from original intention or original 
meaning, but they are actually quite different.  They are arguments about a 
constitution as a system, and about how the parts must work together in order 
to achieve a constitution’s larger goals.  Structural principles may arise from 
the interaction of different parts of the Constitution, and they do not have to 
be intended by anyone in particular.74 
 
72. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885, 889 (1985) (noting that Protestant emphasis on sola Scriptura “rejected the rich medieval 
tradition of interpretation . . . [and] spurned the medieval acceptance of Pope and council as 
authoritative interpreters”). 
73. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UN-
JUST WORLD 238 (2011) (“The conservative movement’s turn to originalism was natural for a 
revolutionary political movement. . . .  Arguments for a return to origins, for stripping away 
encrustations of existing practice and looking to the original meaning of past commitments are the 
familiar language of dissenters.”). 
74.  BALKIN, supra note 27, at 142 (“Structural principles do not have to have been intended by 
anyone in particular; indeed, they may only become apparent over time as we watch how the 
various elements of the constitutional system interact with each other.”); id. at 262 (“[S]tructural 
principles might emerge from the constitutional system that no single person or generation 
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Chief Justice Warren offered a structural argument in Bolling v. Sharpe 
when he said that it would be “unthinkable” to bind the states to a guarantee 
of racial equality but not the federal government.75  The point of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction was to establish a single national standard for basic 
civil rights and civil liberties.76  If Brown v. Board of Education was correct 
that racial equality (at least in public education) was a basic right of national 
citizenship, a fortiori it had to apply to the national government.  The same 
structural logic justified another of the Warren Court’s most important 
achievements—its decision to apply almost all of the Bill of Rights to the 
states through the Due Process Clause.77 
Philip Gossett offers structural arguments both for including and for not 
including the do di petto in Il Trovatore.  “Looking exclusively at the end of 
the aria,” he explains, “the interpolated note is nothing but harmless 
pyrotechnics.  As assertive a cabaletta as Verdi ever wrote, the piece closes 
the third act, brings down the curtain, and moves the opera precipitously to 
the final catastrophe.”78  In fact, Gossett argues, “Verdi’s conclusion demon-
strates his wish to preserve an unusual level of tension.”79  Ordinarily the 
tenor would have descended from the G to a lower C at the aria’s conclusion; 
however, Verdi keeps the tenor on G, “so that [the tenor] Manrico concludes 
on the fifth of the C major chord, while the first tenors [in the chorus] take 
the e below it and the second tenors and basses sing middle c.  The result is a 
full tonic triad, with Manrico alone on the highest note.”80 
But if creating tension was Verdi’s structural goal, why not “intensify 
this effect further, by giving c, e, and g to the male chorus, with [the tenor] 
free to ascend to high c?”81  As noted above, Gossett believes that Verdi did 
not choose this path in part because he was worried about Baucardé’s range 
and consistency.  But modern tenors can routinely hit the note confidently 
and powerfully.82  Thus there is a structural argument for heightening dra-
matic impact—and fulfilling the opera’s larger purpose—when a tenor is 
available to sing the high C. 
 
intended. . . .  We must look to other generations as well as the founding generation to understand 
how constitutional structures should work (and how they might fail to work).”). 
75. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
76. Balkin, supra note 27, at 1809. 
77. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–51 (1968) (applying the Sixth Amendment 
jury trial right to states and listing cases applying different portions of the Bill of Rights to the 
states). 
78. GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 124–25. 
79. Id. at 125. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See 3 RICHARD TARUSKIN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF WESTERN MUSIC: THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 579 (2005) (“[S]ingers since Caruso have treated the composer’s notation as a minimum 
expectation.  Indeed, any singer who does not have a version of that final roulade up to Caruso’s 
high C runs the risk of being hissed off the stage.”). 
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But there is also a structural argument in the opposite direction.  “The 
real disaster of the interpolated high c,” Gossett argues, “is its effect on the 
choice of an appropriate tenor to sing the role of Manrico.  The sine qua non 
for an opera house today, as it casts the part, has become the ability of a tenor 
to let loose a stentorian high c at the end of ‘Di quella pira.’”83  The musical 
tail has begun to wag the operatic dog.  “The interpolated note has come to 
dominate the conception of the part, and everything else is planned around an 
effect that Verdi never intended.” 84   In order “[t]o produce the high c, 
furthermore, singers generally cut the cabaletta by half and omit the notes 
that they should be singing with the chorus, so as to preserve breath and 
energy for the final pitch.”85 
Whichever way one reasons, Gossett believes that the structure—or the 
artistic integrity—of the opera is ultimately more important than scrupulous 
adherence to the written text: 
[W]hether Manrico does or does not produce a high c is of little 
artistic importance.  What is artistically devastating is that the 
perceived need to hit the stratospheric note has transformed our 
conception of the role.  Give me a tenor who can sing Manrico as 
Verdi conceived the part and chooses to add a ringing high c, and I 
will join the loggione in applauding him.  Failing that, let Manrico, in 
Rossini’s famous words to the same Tamberlick, leave his high c on 
the hat rack, to be picked up on his way out of the theater.86 
III. Constraint in Performance: Off-the-Wall and On-the-Wall 
At a conference on law and music held at the University of Texas in 
2001, the do di petto produced an interesting conversation about interpretive 
constraint, genre, and power.  Comparing music to law, the distinguished 
musicologist Lewis Lockwood noted that opera singers were constrained by 
“the laws of music” and harmony.87  Whether or not a high C was acceptable 
in 1850, surely a tenor could not get away with singing an F-sharp.  At the 
aria’s conclusion, the tenor and the chorus are singing a C major chord.88  
The tenor can sing a G, or an E, or a C (the notes of the C major triad).89  
But, Lockwood explained, “[i]t cannot be any other pitch.  It might be A if 
you want to turn it into Kurt Weill. . . .  But nobody in his right mind would 
try that.  My fear is if somebody did do it, the gallery gods would rise and 
 
83. GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 126. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 127. 
87. Lewis Lockwood, What Are the Links Between Law & Performing Arts?, Panel at the 
University of Texas Law and Art Symposium: From Text to Performance: Law and Other 
Performing Arts 19 (Mar. 4, 2002) (transcript on file with author). 
88. G. VERDI, IL TROVATORE 325 (Dover 1994) (1853). 
89. GOSSETT, supra note 15, at 125. 
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cheer.”90  Then, further analogizing from music to law, Lockwood suggested 
that “the singing of an F-sharp is musically—pardon the expression—
‘illegal,’ whereas singing an E would not be. . . .  [Y]ou can not quite treat 
Il Trovatore as if it were that varied.”91 
In fact, Lockwood’s argument is not so much about the “laws of 
harmony” as about the constraints of canon, convention, and genre.  His 
reference to the twentieth-century composer Kurt Weill—who, among other 
things, brought jazz influences into European classical music 92 —is the 
telltale sign. 
Take the question of genre.  The kinds of harmonic innovations singers 
are permitted to interpolate depend on the kind of music Il Trovatore is.  Jazz 
singers like Ella Fitzgerald or Sarah Vaughan can add blues notes to a Cole 
Porter standard, but this would normally be impermissible in Verdi. 
Mid-nineteenth-century Italian opera was not particularly daring 
harmonically, at least in comparison to contemporaries like Richard Wagner 
or Franz Liszt, much less later composers like Claude Debussy or Arnold 
Schoenberg.93  Verdi’s musical palate did not employ the complex rhythms, 
blues notes, or harmonies of mid-twentieth-century American jazz.  In a 
Duke Ellington composition a final C major chord can have a D on top 
because it is a ninth.  One could also have an F-sharp in a serial composition 
of the early twentieth century, or as part of a chord with an augmented fourth 
(or a diminished fifth) in a Wagnerian opera.94  (In fact, if the D resolved to a 
C or the F-sharp to a G, they would be permissible as a passing note or as an 
appoggiatura even in the Italian opera of Verdi’s time.) 
Lockwood is correct that under the harmonic conventions of mid-
nineteenth-century Italian opera both the D and the F-sharp are out of 
bounds.  They are “illegal,” however, not because the laws of harmony in 
general demand it, but because the conventions of Italian opera do.  As long 
as performers and audiences agree to abide by those conventions, such 
interpretations are “off-the-wall.”  An “on-the-wall” interpretation, by 
contrast, is one that is within the genre and conventions of performance, even 
if it is not the best, the most skillful, or the most riveting interpretation. 
 
90. See Lockwood, supra note 87, at 19–20. 
91. Id. at 21. 
92. See JÜRGEN SCHEBERA, KURT WEILL: AN ILLUSTRATED LIFE 75 (Caroline Murphy trans., 
1995) (describing Weill’s introduction of popular forms and jazz elements in the 1920s). 
93. See HARVARD UNIV., THE HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC 381 (Don Michael Randel 
ed., 4th ed. 2003) (viewing Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde as a turning point in the development of 
western harmony, leading to the “‘total chromaticism’ of the 20th century,” the experimentalism of 
composers like Claude Debussy, Maurice Ravel, Béla Bartók, and Igor Stravinsky, and, in Arnold 
Schoenberg, a “chromaticism [that] goes beyond tonality altogether”). Verdi’s Il Trovatore 
premiered in 1853, six years before Wagner finished Tristan und Isolde, and some twelve years 
before Tristan’s first performance in 1865.  Id. at 588–89, 911. 
94. See id. at 911 (describing the harmonic structure of the “Tristan chord”). 
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The point, however, is that conventions of appropriate performance can 
and do change over time.  Within Verdi’s own lifetime, harmonic 
conventions were drastically expanded (he died in 1901),95 and by the first 
few decades of the twentieth century composers began experimenting with 
atonality, serialism, and jazz harmonies.96  Today one could interpolate a D 
or an F-sharp only as a deliberate allusion to other genres of music, or as an 
attempt to superimpose another harmonic tradition on Verdian opera.  
Whether this would be successful would depend on whether it was accepted 
by audiences and adopted by other performers.  Like Lockwood, I am 
dubious that this would work, but in studying the history of artistic 
interpretation, one learns never to say never. 
Put another way, genre and convention shape what performers can do 
and cannot do in performance, but genre and convention are subject to the 
history of subsequent performance.  Performers sometimes have incentives to 
stretch or alter conventions, or otherwise push the performative envelope in 
order to create new effects for audiences. 
Consider Maestro Muti’s choice of G instead of C in this light.  
Although Muti claimed that he was merely acting as the faithful servant of 
Verdi’s text, he was actually confounding the existing conventions of Italian 
opera, which celebrate bravura display and emotional exaggeration.  His 
“self-effacing deference” might actually be “arrogance cloaked as humility,” 
as Justice William Brennan once said of the philosophy of original 
intention.97 
In fact, by deliberately refusing to perform the traditional do di petto, 
Muti’s strict adherence to the printed text could be said to be off-the-wall, 
and the audience let him know it in no uncertain terms.  But that judgment 
can change over time.  If enough conductors, performers, and critics get 
behind Muti’s approach, it may eventually become accepted as not only a 
permissible way to perform Verdi, but the correct way, even in very 
traditional venues like La Scala. 
An important example of how performance practices move from off-
the-wall to on-the-wall is the authentic performance movement.  At first, 
audiences and critics resisted the authentic performance movement because 
they disliked the textures, timbres, and tempi employed by authenticists.98  
Eventually, however, audiences and critics were won over, and it became 
expected that performers would play music—especially music of the 
 
95. McInerney, supra note 1. 
96. See ALEX ROSS, THE REST IS NOISE: LISTENING TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 33–52, 74–
77, 196–97 (2007) (describing the development of atonal and twelve-tone composition and the 
influence of jazz in early-twentieth century classical music). 
97. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. at Georgetown 
University (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
11, 14 (1986). 
98. Levinson & Balkin, Other Performing Arts, supra note 29, at 1611 nn.53 & 55, 1616–17. 
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Baroque and early Classical eras—using “authentic” techniques. 99  
Conductors who continued to use large orchestras with traditional string 
vibrato in baroque and classical pieces were sometimes described as playing 
“big band” versions of the classics.100 
Similar points apply to legal interpretation.  Constraint in legal 
interpretation comes from analogous ideas of genre, convention, and canon, 
which are enforced by a wide range of institutions.  Nevertheless, just as in 
musical performance, things can move from off-the-wall to on-the-wall over 
time.  In fact, the history of American constitutional law is the history of 
ideas and arguments moving from off-the-wall to on-the-wall and, in some 
cases, becoming the new orthodoxy of a later era.101 
In music, as in law, the most important factor in moving things from 
off-the-wall to on-the-wall is whether enough people are willing to get 
behind these new ideas, and whether people who are well-placed in terms of 
power, position, and influence are willing to put their resources and 
reputations behind them.102  The constitutional arguments of the gay rights 
movement took many years to be taken seriously.  In 1986, Justice Byron 
White dismissed as off-the-wall the idea that the Constitution prevented 
states from imprisoning people for same-sex relations: “[T]o claim that a 
right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, 
facetious.”103  At that point, the modern gay rights movement (measured 
 
99. Id. at 1611. 
100. See, e.g., MARCH ET AL., supra note 48, at 698 (describing Sir Colin Davis’s performances 
of Mozart symphonies as “big-band Mozart” that “reflect little or no influence from period 
performance”). 
101. See BALKIN, supra note 73, at 12, 61, 69–70, 88, 119, 177–83 (2011) (explaining the 
importance of the ideas of off-the-wall and on-the-wall constitutional arguments to constitutional 
change). 
102. See id. at 88.  As I have explained elsewhere: 
Law, and especially constitutional law, is grounded in judgments by legal professionals 
about what is reasonable: these judgments include what legal professionals think is 
obviously correct, clearly wrong, or is a matter of dispute on which reasonable minds 
can disagree.  But what people think is reasonable depends in part on what they think 
that other people think.  Arguments move from off the wall to on the wall because 
people and institutions are willing to put their reputations on the line and state that an 
argument formerly thought beyond the pale is not crazy at all, but is actually a pretty 
good legal argument.  Moreover, it matters greatly who vouches for the argument—
whether they are well-respected, powerful and influential, and how they are situated in 
institutions with professional authority or in institutions like politics or the media that 
shape public opinion.  The Obama Justice Department has now officially taken the 
view that discrimination against homosexuals should be subjected to close judicial 
scrutiny, and the president has recently declared himself in favor of legalizing same-sex 
marriages.  Together these announcements give enormous momentum to the decades-
long struggle for constitutional rights for gays and lesbians. 
Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, 
ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-
to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/. 
103. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). 
2013] Verdi’s High C 1705 
 
 
from the 1969 Stonewall Riots) was only 17 years old.104  Seventeen years 
later, however, in Lawrence v. Texas, 105  what was once off-the-wall had 
become on-the-wall.  What Justice White thought facetious a majority of the 
Supreme Court now thought the best interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause.106  How did the gay rights movement succeed?  It did so through 
gradually changing public opinion at the national, state, and local levels; 
through efforts at shaping popular culture; through legislative lobbying; 
through litigation campaigns; through decisions by gays and lesbians to 
publicly announce their sexual orientation and live openly; and through 
repeated arguments made by political, legal, cultural, and academic elites.107  
As more and more people in influential and powerful institutions accepted 
and argued for equal rights for homosexuals, these ideas became increasingly 
acceptable to the general public and to legal elites. 
In like fashion, the success of the authentic performance movement 
came slowly, over time, as historically informed performers began to 
infiltrate and later dominate concert halls and recording studios, win over 
critics, and reproduce themselves in conservatories and music academies.  
Like the success of the gay rights movement, the success of the authentic 
performance movement is a Gramscian-style “march through the 
institutions.”108 
This offers us yet another way of explaining the idea that the do di petto 
is a gift from the people to Verdi.  The “gift” in this case is the result of years 
of practice and mobilization in various institutions of power and influence 
that reshape musical common sense and move things from off-the-wall to on-
the-wall.  The result of this effort is an interpretation that now seems 
reasonable, obvious, or natural.  What the people gave to Verdi—or to the 
interpretation of Verdi—was a conception of reasonableness; in the same 
way, what generations of social and political movements have bestowed on 
the Constitution is a sense of reasonableness about how to make sense of 
abstract or vague texts like “freedom of speech” or “equal protection of the 
laws.” 
One of the most important sources of power in shaping canon, 
convention, and genre is the audience.  Performers generally attempt to 
 
 104. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 
15 (1999). 
105. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
106. Id. at 578–79. 
107. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  See generally LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: 
THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION (2012). 
108. See generally ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quintin 
Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971) (describing the “war of position” between 
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influence and communicate with their audiences; if audiences don’t like what 
performers do, it undermines their ability to perform. 
The important point is that the audience that happens to be at La Scala 
at a particular moment is not the only one that matters for shaping the 
conventions of performance.  Perhaps Maestro Muti may not care much for 
the people in the balconies—indeed, he rebuked them—but there are other 
audiences about which he cares deeply.  Just as there can be multiple authors 
and multiple performers, there can also be multiple audiences, in different 
places and at different times, each of whom may place duties, expectations, 
or constraints on the performer.  Audiences exist in institutions, and their 
views are mediated by these institutions.  When we talk about the role of the 
audience in shaping performance, then, we are really talking about the role of 
institutions that affect performance and before which performance occurs. 
First, audiences may be differentiated by time or space: When Riccardo 
Muti conducts at La Scala, his performance may be recorded for later 
audiences, who may listen or watch it in many different places, and in many 
different situations—in a movie theatre, sitting at home, or driving in a car.  
The creation of technologies for recorded performance in the twentieth 
century greatly multiplied the number of potential audiences for any single 
performance. 
Second, audiences may be differentiated by expertise.  Muti’s 
performance before a live audience at La Scala reaches out to laypersons 
who know little of opera, to professional musicians in attendance, and to the 
loggionisti who are devoted—and often critical—fans. 
Third, audiences may be differentiated by role.  The same performance 
may be reviewed by professional music journalists and music critics.  It may 
be evaluated by impresarios and record companies who may want to hire 
Muti, Licitra, or the other performers for future concerts and recordings. 
Fourth, audiences may be differentiated by their respective places in 
professional culture.  Most of the members of the audience at La Scala are 
probably not conductors or opera singers themselves.  Nevertheless, well-
trained musicians often perform against the background of the expectations 
and judgments of other professional or professionally trained musicians.  
Musicians’ performances may also be shaped—consciously or 
unconsciously—by the expectations and judgments of their former teachers, 
by their peers, or by fellow members of the genre or the “school” of 
performance to which they belong.  Even if these fellow professionals are not 
in the live audience, they nevertheless shape—sometimes subtly, sometimes 
profoundly—what a performer believes he or she must do, and what makes 
for a good, bad, or mediocre performance.  Indeed, a performer may regard a 
standing ovation from the untutored as less important than the judgment of 
peers or teachers gained over decades of interaction.  The internalized 
audience may be more powerful than the audience immediately before an 
interpreter. 
2013] Verdi’s High C 1707 
 
 
As these examples demonstrate, the triangle of performance is usually 
embedded in institutions.  Whether or not these institutions are salient in any 
particular performance, their influence is always present.  An opera 
performance, for example, occurs in an opera house paid for by subscriptions 
or subsidized by taxpayers and managed by a company.  The conductors and 
performers are conservatory-trained and owe debts of influence to teachers 
and colleagues.  Their work is reviewed by journalists and critics, and the 
artists seek to attract contracts from recording companies and performance 
opportunities from other opera companies and musical organizations. 
The relationships and duties of interpretation between author, 
performer, and audience, therefore, are always mediated by institutional 
structures, including the forms of power and the social conventions that come 
with them.  For example, Muti’s performance at La Scala either made use of 
or was the result of, among other things, opera companies, conservatories 
and apprenticeships, competitions, record companies, and the 
Internet/YouTube (where a version of Muti’s La Scala interpretation 
currently appears).109 
Similar points apply to the triangle of performance in law.  A judge who 
decides a case is constrained by and responding to a wide range of 
influences: the appointments process, the party system, legal education and 
legal culture, the opinions of professional peers, and the multiple social 
institutions that constitute one’s lived experience.  (Consider, for example, 
how desegregation of institutions like the United States Army and Major 
League Baseball paved the way for Brown v. Board of Education.) 110  
Conventions of interpretation and expectations about proper performance 
change as a result of controversies and struggles within these various 
institutions.  This is as true for music as it is for law. 
IV. Conclusion: Performance and Canonicity 
Throughout this Essay I have noted similarities between legal and 
musical performance, showing how these similarities arise from the fact that 
in law and in many performing arts performers need to interpret a text and 
put it into action.  For that reason, both law and the performing arts feature a 
triangle of performance between authors, performers, and audiences, and 
both law and the performing arts use similar modalities of argument to 
legitimate the choices made by interpreters. 
I close however, with an important area of difference.  It concerns 
canonicity: the kinds of performances that participants deem mandatory or 
canonical, and how that canonicity is enforced through institutions. 
 
109. Radio Televisione Italiana, Il Trovatore, YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=6AGQeg0M28Y. 
110. See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Interpretation, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1537, 1547 (2004) (noting the importance of Jackie Robinson’s and Harry Truman’s 
actions in shaping a political culture in which Brown v. Board of Education became possible). 
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First, note that it is mandatory to interpret and apply laws in a sense in 
which it is not mandatory to interpret artistic works like Il Trovatore.  
Conductors and opera companies do not have to perform Il Trovatore 
(unless, that is, they are contractually obligated to do so); they can choose to 
perform another work instead.  By contrast, laws presumptively apply to 
particular situations; ordinarily they must be performed if they are deemed 
relevant. 
Second, when the Supreme Court decides a case like Bolling v. Sharpe, 
its decision is binding on all the lower courts and upon the Supreme Court 
itself (unless the Court overturns or limits the decision).  Lower courts and 
the Supreme Court are supposed to follow the original decision, or at least 
give very good reasons why they should not.  And if a lower court disobeys 
the interpretation of a higher court, a higher court has the right to reverse it.  
On the other hand, when Riccardo Muti decides that he is going to perform 
the G in the printed score instead of the traditional high C, his decision does 
not have the same effect.  Nothing prevents another opera conductor from 
performing the high C that very same night in another opera house 
somewhere in the world.  And if another conductor does so, there is very 
little that Muti can do other than criticize. 
In the United States, court decisions are organized hierarchically—with 
higher courts able to supervise and reverse lower courts—whereas opera 
performances are not.  Interpretations of the highest courts are canonical: 
They are mandatory guidelines for how lower courts should perform the law. 
Indeed, rival interpretations of the Constitution are normally frowned 
on; the goal, if not the practical reality, is that the judicial system should 
converge toward a single interpretation even if this is not always realistic.  In 
music and many other performing arts, however, it is possible to have 
multiple interpretations of the same work.  In fact, a multiplicity of 
interpretations is often encouraged and admired because it allows performers 
to demonstrate the quality and uniqueness of their particular genius. 
By contrast, a legal system like that in the United States has far less 
patience with idiosyncratic judges who pride themselves on showing off their 
talents by deciding cases in ways that no other judges would.  One might 
argue for interpretive convergence on rule of law grounds: although in 
practice it may make a great deal of difference before whom a litigant 
appears, the ideal is that the law for each person should be the same 
regardless of the judge involved. 
Nevertheless, this difference is not due not to inherent features of law 
and the performing arts, but rather to how these institutions are structured 
and to their governing conventions.  It is certainly possible to imagine art 
forms in which the best performance is one that conforms as much as 
possible to a canonical example.  Consider, for example, the desire of many 
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popular music fans to hear a live version that is as close as possible to the 
recorded version they know and love.111 
Conversely, it is possible to have legal systems that are not 
hierarchically ordered, or that are pluralist, or that countenance a wide range 
of different interpretive results.  To some extent even the American system of 
law contemplates the possibility that the different branches of government 
may interpret the Constitution differently.  Judicial supremacy may exist in 
the United States, but it is also controversial. 
In fact, the point of comparing law to the performing arts consists 
precisely in the fact that as soon as we attempt to list clear differences, we 
begin to see how internally differentiated both categories are.  What we 
discover are a variety of different performance practices within law, music, 
and drama, with different methods of enforcing genre, convention, and 
constraint. 
The big division, then, is not law versus music or drama.  Instead we 
should ask what kind of practice we are dealing with and how it is organized 
institutionally.  What are the traditions of performance that apply to the 
practice, and how are these traditions enforced?  What are the forms or 
sources of authority to engage in performance?  What degree of variation is 
permitted or encouraged between different interpreters?  How is convergence 
in interpretation encouraged or enforced?  How do the conventions of good 
and bad, correct and incorrect performance change over time, and what role 
do institutions play in facilitating or resisting these changes?  These 
questions are as relevant to legal performance as to the performance of music 
or drama.  They are why law, like music or drama, is a performing art. 
 
 
111. See, e.g., Chris Nelson, Lip-Synching Gets Real, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004, http://www.ny 
times.com/2004/02/01/arts/music-lip-synching-gets-real.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm (“[F]or 
an increasing portion of the pop music audience, perfection is more desirable than authenticity—
especially when they’re paying almost $100 a ticket for an elaborately choreographed concert.”). 
